Byron’s materialism
In an August 1819 letter to his publisher John Murray, Bryon gives a two-pronged definition of the kind of artistic freedom – and by extension freedom per se – that he would express in and through Don Juan:
You ask me for the plan of Donny Johnny: I have no plan – I had no plan; but I had or have materials; though if…I am ‘to be snubbed so when I am in spirits’, the poem will be naught, and the poet turn serious again. If it don’t take, I will leave it off where it is, with all due respect to the Public; but if continued, it must be in my own way. You might as well make Hamlet (or Diggory) ‘act mad’ in a strait waistcoat as trammel my buffoonery, if I am to be a buffoon: their gestures and my thoughts would only be pitiably absurd and ludicrously constrained. Why, Man the Soul of such writing is its licence; at least the liberty of that licence, if one likes – not that one should abuse it- it is like trial by Jury and Peerage and the Habeas Corpus – a very fine thing, but chiefly in the reversion; because no one wishes to be tried for the mere pleasure of proving his possession of the privilege.
So Byronic freedom requires 1) materials but not a plan; i.e. it must be improvisatory, spontaneous; but the criterion of spontaneity, or the “liberty” of the “license” is 2) transgression (or “reversion”): i.e., freedom isn’t a matter of conforming to expectations of free behavior but of testing or even defying such expectations, so that it is all but indistinguishable from “madness,” buffoonery,” ” and “pitiable absurdity;” but what makes genuine liberty avoid conformity on the one hand and madness on the other is that it 3) “takes with the public;” i.e., that the public learns to like what initially appeared as a ‘mad, bad and dangerous’ transgression against its own standards and expectations. So in short freedom = a kind of craziness that society officially renounces but secretly or unknowingly actually likes. This already suggests part of why Byron associates freedom so closely with sex.
As we discussed on Friday DJ’s Dedication and first Canto take the poetic and political elite of Byron’s time to task for falling far short on these counts. In particular Byron faults them for what he characterizes as sexless obscurantism: the “mysteries,” “explanation-begging explanations” of “emasculated,” “intellectual eunuchs.” They make up boring, impotent theories of freedom rather than doing it; convincingly showing us what it’s about. I explained this contrast by referring to Nietzsche’s account of “clumsy lovers” from the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil:
SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman–what then? Is there not ground for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been dogmatists, have failed to understand women–that the terrible seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman? Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien–IF, indeed, it stands at all!
By contrast, Byron like Nietzsche casts himself as an expert lover who rather than “importunately” and “clumsily” trying to force truth to obey dogmatic theories instead tries to seduce truth with bravura displays of poetic and intellectual finesse. In other words Byron doesn’t try to vanquish truth’s elusiveness–to brutally claim it as an object of knowledge–but to match it with his own poetic nuance; to erotically resonate with it rather than defeat it. So as we discussed his use of language tends to evoke the intense materiality and unpredictability of sensuous experience.
In a another (perhaps offensive) letter (written to his friend Kinnaird a little later in the same year) , Byron goes so far as to literally equate rather than just (like Nietzche) figuratively liken this materiality (or “the thing”) to sex and in particular female sexuality:
As to ‘Don Juan’ — confess — confess you dog — and be candid — that it is the sublime of that there sort of writing — it may be bawdy — but it it is not good English — it may be profligate but is it not life, is it not the thing? — Could any man have written it — who has not lived in the world? And tooled in a post-chaise? in a hackney coach? in a Gondola? against a Wall? in a court-carriage? in a vis-a-vis? — on a table? — and under it? I have written about a hundred stanzas of a third Canto – but it is damned modest – the outcry has frightened me. – I had such projects for the Don – but the Cant is so much stronger than Cunt – now a days, – that the benefit of experience in a man who had well weighted the worth of both monosyllables – must be lost to despairing posterity.
Byron claims that although we might fear to admit it, his poem compels us to “confess” that writing that moves beyond the easy but vacuous legibility of one monosyllable to the truth of the other may be dangerously ‘bawdy’ and ‘profligate’ but this is precisely what allows it to do justice to life and to be worthy literature (or “good English”).
Byron’s historicism
Yet although Byron claims his method subordinates any “plan” to spontaneous engagement with “materials,” Don Juan does have a plan; in fact in a way it has about the most ambitious plan imaginable: to retell all of European history in the manner just outlined: not by schematizing and rationalizing this history but by seducing the ineffably subtle subterranean material truths of each stage of its development. This plan helps explain Juan’s defining feature which is his passivity. Byron adapted this character type from his favorite novelist Walter Scott, the inventor of the historical novel (another key innovation of the romantic period which we unfortunately didn’t have time for this semester; but Don Juan can give you an idea of what you’re missing). Scott’s principal technique for retelling history was to do so through the eyes of quite unremarkable and passive characters who randomly happen to find themselves in the midst of historical individuals and events. Their passivity makes such characters particularly realistic lenses through which to view history unfolding in the moment because it makes us see history happening to them, without pretending to have any magical access to the minds of the great and storied individuals themselves who ‘make’ history. History thus appears as an opaque force of material circumstances rather than as the expression of the subjective designs of historical demigods a la Napoleon (so in CH Byron celebrates Napoleon more for how he sacrificed himself to history than how he shaped it). And this is arguably what historical literature per se should do: if historicism is the idea that people don’t write themselves into history through great acts so much as history writes itself through such acts, then literature should represent history not as what people plan but what gets imposed on them (despite their plans) by inscrutable material circumstances.
So throughout DJ Juan plays this role of a more or less passive spectator as the poem progresses through the various stages of European history, from the barbarism of the shipwreck episode to the commercial manners of the final English cantos. A key question to raise about the poem (or a question that the poem raises about itself) then is: how well does it manage to engage the opaque “materials” of history that abstract “plans” disguise?
I suggested on Friday that DJ’s account of Juan’s and Julia’s mutual submission can be seen as evoking the materiality characteristic of what Byron saw as the hypocritical culture of moral and intellectual ‘platonism’ of his own historical period, a culture that Donna Inez (standing in for Byron’s estranged wife) emblematizes. In a phrase like “pure Platonic squeeze,” the onomatopoetic sensuality of the word squeeze represents a complete subversion of the platonism it supposedly (in the mind of Inez’s protege, Julia) expresses. The poem speaks to us on the same level of sheer sensuality that we noticed in the alliterations of “Darkness,” and indeed the subversion set in motion by “squeeze” retrospectively extends to the alliteration of “pure Platonic.” Thus, rather than a vehicle for representing meaning the phrase comes to embody something more like the self-deconstruction of such representation: the claim to platonic conceptual purity becomes the conduit of an utterly non-conceptual sensuality of ‘p’-sounds in our mouths and squeeze feelings in our bodies. This is Byron’s way of telling the unwritten actual history of the hypocritical culture of moral and intellectual piety that Donna Inez emblematizes: rather than clumsily and importunately compelling history into analytical categories, he uses ‘seductive’ poetic technique to make us virtually feel it. So it is crucial that, although this ‘feeling’ subverts the Plantonism that attempts to conceal it, it doesn’t do so arbitrarily: rather Byron’s point (the point of Byron’s historicism) is that this sensuality is specific to the hypocritical Plantonic culture in which it operates: it is a historically specific phenomenon; it is the materiality in which alone historical specificity registers, is felt, as such.
The limitation of Byron’s historical materialism?
Although we don’t have time to read it all I want to draw your attention to a section of the poem that might indicate the limit of Byron’s method, or of his application of his method. Canto 9 centers on Catherine the Great whose modernized court typifies something about the social structure of Europe’s developing nation states in the eighteenth century. Byron here it might be argued tips the balance of his writing away from seductive technique and toward importunate explanation. Byron makes Catharine’s overwhelming sexuality “epitomize” the primal cause of human history per se; Byron posits Catherine’s monstrous sexuality as a timeless explanatory ground. But in order to prop up this picture of female sexuality as the prime mover of history, the poet arguably abandons his seductive finesse for clumsy dogmatism: it becomes more important for Byron to decode the plan of history, to harness it as an object of knowledge, than seductively to engage its materials. At a particularly remarkable moment, the significance of which Byron underscores by breaching his customary third person decorum, the poet himself addresses an apostrophe to Catherine’s genitalia:
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Oh, thou ‘teterrima Causa’ of all ‘belli’—
Thou gate of Life and Death—thou nondescript!
Whence is our exit and our entrance,–well I
May pause in pondering how all Souls are dipt
In thy perennial fountain—how man fell, I
Know not, since Knowledge saw her branches stript
Of her first fruit, but how he falls and rises
Since, thou has settled beyond all surmises.
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Some call thee ‘the worst Cause of war,’ but I
Maintain thou art the best: for after all
From thee we come, to thee we go, and why
To get at thee not batter down a wall,
Or waste a world? Since no one can deny
Thou dost replenish worlds both great and small:
With, or without thee, all things at a stand
Are, or would be, thou Sea of Life’s dry Land!
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Catherine, who was the grand Epitome
Of that great Cause of war, or peace, or what
You please (it causes all the things which be,
So you may take your choice of this or that)—
Catherine, I say, was very glad to see
The handsome herald, on whose plumage sat
Victory; and, pausing as she saw him kneel
With his dispatch, forgot to break the seal.
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Then recollecting the whole Empress, nor
Forgetting quite the Woman (which composed
At least three parts of this great whole), she tore
The letter open…
Byron turns Catherine, into the “Epitome” of what he calls the cause of all things, or in the master pun of this passage, the great (w)hole itself. This is Catherine as Woman per se, and as such the cause of all Man’s fallings and risings. But in making her genitalia stand for the scene of “our exists and our entrances” Byron also underscores the hollowness of his conceit, since whereas the we who exit isn’t gender specific, Byron implies that men alone constitute the we who enter. The potential problem is that Byron is making a serious claim here that goes beyond his typical ironic play: a claim to identify what he in the letter calls “the thing” that makes the world defy all attempts at explanation and that thereby also licenses his poetry’s ironic play. Byron exploits Catherine’s notorious heterosexuality in order to make the uncontainable female sexuality she epitomizes into a symbol of unproblematized passion as such, the element of pure unintelligibility. You could say he did the same thing with the word ‘squeeze’ but the comparison reveals the key difference: whereas Byron’s poetic technique functioned to allow us to feel the squeeze in a way opposed to its meaning, here Byron points out the thing order to know it as such. This would seem to amount to exactly the kind of de-eroticizing dogmatism Byron condemned: sex here has become an object of knowledge, ‘the thing’ as the prime cause to which we can rationally retrace events, not the spontaneous eruption of inexplicably but seductively sensuous ‘squeezes’ in Byron’s text.